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Chapter 7 
Against Social Evolution: Deleuze and 
Guattari’s Social Topology
Daniel W. Smith
Complex states did not and could not have evolved out of more ‘primi-
tive’ hunter-gatherer societies. This is the profound thesis that lies at the 
heart of Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of traditional theories of social 
evolution. The widespread presumption that human societies evolved 
progressively from the simple to the complex, from the ‘primitive’ to the 
‘civilised’, from hunter-gatherer groups to large state formations, received 
perhaps its paradigmatic formulation in Lewis Henry Morgan’s 1877 
book, Ancient Society; Or: Researches in the Lines of Human Progress 
from Savagery through Barbarism to Civilization, a work that had a pro-
found infl uence on numerous nineteenth-century thinkers, most notably 
Marx and Engels (Morgan 1877; Carneiro 2003). The title of the third 
chapter of Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus (‘Savages, Barbarians, 
Civilized Men’) is derived from Morgan’s work, even though Morgan’s 
name is never mentioned (Deleuze and Guattari 2009: 139). But the ref-
erence to Morgan’s linear and progressive concept of social evolution is 
clearly meant to be provocative, since the universal history developed in 
the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia is not only explicitly 
directed against conceptions of social progress, but is grounded in what 
Deleuze calls a ‘non-chronological’ conception of time (Deleuze 1989: 
79). Time as succession gives way to time as coexistence: time does not 
move from one actual moment to another (chronology), but rather from 
the virtual to the actual (actualisation).1 Deleuze and Guattari are not 
denying social change, but they are arguing that we cannot understand 
social change unless we see it as taking place within a fi eld of coexistence.
Deleuze frequently noted that his concept of time was initially 
derived from biology, and especially embryology (Ruyer): the apparent 
chronology of a life in terms of a past, a present and a future is in fact 
the unfolding of the potential of an egg (a body without organs), an 
unceasing genetic movement from the virtual to the actual.2 Deleuze’s 
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metaphysics of time is in a sense a generalisation of this biological fact: 
time is no longer a measure of movement, as it was for the Greeks; 
rather, all movement – whether cosmic, biological or social – must be 
understood to be unfolding synthetically within a topological fi eld. 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia thus not only contains one of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s most sustained engagements with evolutionary theory, 
but it also provides one of the most concrete examples of how to anal-
yse the ‘evolution’ of a domain (in this case, the socio-political domain) 
from the viewpoint of a temporal fi eld of coexistence. 
The State Had No ‘Origin’ 
Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of social evolution begins with the the-
ory of the State, and a consideration of the nature of ancient despotic 
States such as Sumer, Babylon or Egypt. What was the origin of such 
States, and how did they acquire their astonishing dominance? Marx 
suggested a famous answer to such questions: the archaic State was a 
milieu of interiority that managed to stockpile the surplus production 
of the surrounding agricultural communities (‘primitive accumulation’), 
thereby constituting a transcendent public power that converged on 
the person of the despot (Marx 1965: 69–70; cf. Deleuze and Guattari 
2009: 194). Following Marx, the great archaeologist V. Gordon Childe 
proposed a theory of the origins of prehistoric states that has become 
canonical (Childe 1951; 2009; cf. Lul l and Mico 2011: 180–9): at some 
point in prehistory, hunter-gatherer groups learned to cultivate grain 
and raise livestock (the Neolithic revolution), and it was the surplus of 
agricultural food that is supposed to have made the State possible, with 
its complex divisions of labour, large economic projects and intricate 
social organisation (the Urban revolution) (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 
428). In other words, primitive societies eventually reached a threshold 
in their ‘mode of production’ that allowed them to pass from an econ-
omy of subsistence to an economy of surplus. Using two complemen-
tary arguments, Deleuze and Guattari contend that the evidence from 
archaeology, ethnography and even history does not support this theory. 
The fi rst argument comes from the analysis of primitive societies. 
Pierre Clastres, in his 1974 book Society Against the State (Clastres 
1989; cf. Clastres 1994) had shown that the absence of a State in primi-
tive societies is not a sign that they were ‘backward’ societies that had 
not yet evolved or developed enough. On the contrary, primitive societies 
are constituted by mechanisms that deliberately ward off the apparatus 
of the State, and actively prevent it from appearing. Clastres emphasised 
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two such mechanisms: the role of chiefs, whose status constantly waxes 
and wanes, thereby preventing the resonance of power in a single des-
pot; and the function of war, which maintained polemical relations of 
antagonism between segmentary lineages, preventing their convergence 
in a state apparatus. Clastres had been infl uenced, in part, by Marshal 
Sahlins’ Stone Age Economics, which argued that hunter-gatherers, far 
from living at a subsistence level requiring constant toil, were in fact the 
fi rst affl uent society, where the quest for food was intermittent and leisure 
was abundant (Sahlins 1972; see Clastres 1994). The absence of a surplus 
did not indicate an inability to develop technical means or overcome envi-
ronmental obstacles, but was a positive goal, socially valorised. Even the 
innovations imported by colonialists were utilised, not to increase pro-
duction but to reduce work time. The work of both Clastres and Sahlins, 
in turn, had been anticipated by Marcel Mauss, whose 1925 essay The 
Gift had already shown that the giving of gifts and counter-gifts (potlatch) 
in primitive societies was a mechanism for warding off the accumulation 
of wealth (Mauss 1954: 3). In short, numerous anthropologists have iden-
tifi ed positive mechanisms in primitive societies that actively prevent the 
formation of a State apparatus: there is a refusal of the State’s apparatus 
of power as much as a refusal of markets and the economy. Primitive 
societies, in this sense, are ‘self-validating’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2009: 
203). If this claim is correct, it makes the appearance of the State diffi cult 
to explain: How could the State have evolved out of primitive hunter-
gatherer societies if these are societies whose very organisation is directed 
against the formation of the State (Silbertin-Blanc 2013: 22)?
The second argument comes from the analysis of the State. The 
urbanist Jane Jacobs, in the fi rst chapter of her 1969 book The Economy 
of Cities, entitled ‘Cities First –Rural Development Later’, launched an 
attack on what she called ‘the dogma of agricultural primacy’ (1970: 3), 
the idea that an agricultural surplus was the condition for the appear-
ance of the State. Jacobs, contentiously, attempted to invert this schema: 
it is the State that creates agriculture, she argued, and not the converse. 
She based her conclusions in part on James Mellaart’s discovery of 
Çatalhöyük, a ‘proto-town’ in Turkey that dates back to Neolithic times 
(7000 bc – the date given to the thirteenth plateau), and perhaps even 
further, and which would thus have been in direct contact with hunter-
gatherers. Jacobs suggests that it is in such States that seeds were fi rst 
gathered, hybridised and fi nally planted, initially in the soil around the 
city, and then expanding into the countryside. To explain (and exorcise) 
the prevalence of the ‘agriculture fi rst’ dogma, Jacobs draws an anal-
ogy with the technologies of electricity (46). Electricity was invented in 
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cities, yet it is primarily in rural areas that we fi nd the massive instal-
lations needed for generating and transmitting electricity: dams, power 
plants, grids. If human memory did not extend back to a time when the 
world had cities but no electricity, the archaeological evidence could 
be interpreted to imply that, initially, there were rural people with no 
electricity; who then developed dams and power plants, eventually pro-
ducing a large enough surplus of electricity to make cities possible. We 
are doing something similar when we claim that an agricultural surplus 
made the State possible, but the error is clear: we turn the results of State 
activity into a precondition for the State. 
The French historian Fernand Braudel, in his Civilization and Capi-
talism, took up a modifi ed version of Jacobs’s thesis, although he was 
writing in a different context, analysing the relation between the urban 
and the rural in fi fteenth- to eighteenth-century Europe. Braudel like-
wise contested the dogma that the countryside ‘necessarily preceded the 
town in time’ but argued, not that cities preceded the countryside, but 
that the two were reciprocally determined. ‘Jane Jacobs, in a persuasive 
book, argues that the town appears at least simultaneously with rural 
settlement, if not before it . . . Town and countryside obeyed the rule 
of “reciprocity of perspectives”: mutual creation, mutual domination, 
mutual exploitation according to the unchanging rules of co-existence’ 
(Braudel 1992: 484, 486: cf. Smith et al. 2014: 1532: ‘Agriculture and 
urbanism . . . developed in tandem’). Although Jacobs and Braudel 
focused their analyses on cities, Deleuze and Guattari (who distinguish 
between the State and Cities) will adopt a variant of Braudel’s thesis 
with regard to the State: not that the State preceded agriculture, but 
that agriculture and the State were co-determined. ‘It is the State that 
creates agriculture, animal raising, and metallurgy; it does so fi rst on its 
own soil, then imposes them on the surrounding world . . . It is not the 
State that presupposes a mode of production, it is the State that makes 
production a “mode.” The last reasons for presuming a progressive 
development are invalidated’ (1987: 429). If the State does not appro-
priate an already-existing surplus, it is because the State itself creates 
the conditions that make a surplus possible. 
Deleuze draws on this second argument when he assesses Fried-
rich Engels’ famous 1884 book on the Origin of the Family, Private 
Property, and the State (Engels 1972). In addition to an agricultural 
surplus, Engels appealed to several additional sets of factors to explain 
the origin of the State: exogenous factors such as the need to organ-
ise wars; endogenous factors such as the rise of private property and 
money; and specifi c factors, such as the emergence of ‘public functions’ 
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(Deleuze 1979a; cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 427). But Deleuze 
shows how each of these factors, far from explaining the emergence 
of the State, in fact presuppose an already-existing State. States can 
and often do appropriate a war-machine for themselves, but such an 
appropriation presupposes that the State already exists. Similarly, no 
one has ever indicated a mechanism through which one could move 
from a communal tribal property to private property, as if one day, 
some exceptional person decided to proclaim, ‘This is mine’. On the 
contrary, archaeology has been able to provide a precise mechanism, 
assignable if variable, showing how private property was constituted 
out of a system of imperial public property through freed slaves – but 
this means that the privatisation of property could become a charac-
teristic of the State only if the public property of the archaic State were 
already given (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 449, 451). The same is 
true for the origin of money, which was created not to promote com-
merce, but for the purposes of taxation, which likewise presupposed 
an already-existing State. Finally, public functions also presuppose a 
State: irrigation, for instance, was an agricultural problem that went 
beyond the capacities of most agricultural communities. 
These analyses all point to the same antinomy: on the one hand, the 
State could not have emerged from the soil of primitive societies, since 
they are directed against the State; on the other hand, the factors typi-
cally put forward to explain the emergence of the State (not only a prior 
agricultural surplus, but also the military, private property, money, pub-
lic works and so on) in fact presuppose an already-existing State. Every 
explanation of the origin of the State is tautological, presuming what it 
seeks to explain. How then can we explain the appearance of the State, 
if it was not the result of a progressive evolutionary process, and if it 
‘leads back to no distinct assignable cause’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 
427)? Deleuze and Guattari draw the only possible conclusion: the State 
appeared in the world fully formed and fully armed, as if it were born an 
adult, ‘a master stroke executed all at once’ [coup de maître en une fois] 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2009: 217; cf. 1987: 427). But what, then, does it 
mean to say that the State appeared in the world ‘fully formed’?
The State is Self-Presupposing (The Apparatus of Capture) 
Deleuze and Guattari’s second thesis is a correlate of the fi rst: if the 
State does not evolve from other social formations, it is because the 
State creates the conditions of its own existence (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987: 446). Although Anti-Oedipus had proposed the term ‘overcoding’ 
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to describe the basic mechanism of the archaic State, the concept of 
‘capture’ introduced in A Thousand Plateaus is meant to provide a more 
detailed account of the way in which overcoding works. The archaic 
State, as a self-conditioning entity, is a transcendent apparatus of cap-
ture that incorporates everything into its form of interiority through 
three primary abstractions – rent, labour and money – which are a vari-
ant of the ‘trinity formula’ analysed by Marx in the third volume of 
Capital (1981: 953), and operate through two interrelated operations: 
direct comparison in the form of abstract quantities, and monopolistic 
appropriation in the form of stock. A brief review of these abstractions 
is enough to bring to light their self-presupposing nature.
Ground Rent. Rent is a mechanism of capture that allows land, or the 
‘earth’, to be incorporated into the State apparatus. But if we understand 
the earth as an abstract general space – the geo in geometry – we must 
say that this abstract space was created by the apparatus of capture. 
‘Before’ the earth, the land was occupied or territorialised without being 
measured or divided: there were only the shifting territories of primitive 
societies, or the smooth spaces occupied by nomadic societies. But the 
State can claim that these territories and their occupation already coex-
ist in a general and abstract space, which is a space that belongs to the 
despot. Moreover, the constitution of the earth (geo) is coexistent with 
its measurement and striation (metron). Every year in Egypt, after the 
Nile fl oods, land surveyors or ‘rope-stretchers’ (hardenonaptai) would 
re-striate the land; the Greeks called them, precisely, the ‘measurers of 
the earth’ (geo-meters) (Serres 1993). The striation of the earth – its divi-
sion and portioning out in plots – was the condition for the extraction 
of rent and tribute, since rent requires a direct and quantitative compari-
son of yields to be drawn between qualitatively different lands. States 
are often seen as territories centred on the palace-temple complex of a 
capital city, but more properly one must say that the State ‘deterritori-
alises’ the surrounding territories and subordinates them to an imperial 
centre of convergence located outside and beyond them (the despot as 
the owner of all the earth).
Labour. Similarly, human activity is appropriated by the State in the 
form of surplus labour, which is stockpiled in large-scale public works 
projects (pyramids, irrigation projects). The State thus implies a spe-
cifi c mode of human activity that does not exist elsewhere: labour. In 
primitive societies, strictly speaking, people do not ‘labour’, even if their 
activities are highly constrained and regulated. Deleuze and Guattari 
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call this non-labour mode of activity free action, which is in continu-
ous variation: one passes from speech to action, from a given action to 
another, from action to song, from song to speech, from speech to enter-
prise, ‘all in a strange chromaticism with intense but rare peak moments, 
or moments of effort that the outside observer can only “translate” in 
terms of work’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 491; cf. Gueroult 1934: 
119ff). For labour to exist, there must be a capture of such human activ-
ity by the State apparatus: it is only in the State that activity comes to 
be compared, linked and subordinated to a common, homogeneous and 
abstract quantity called ‘labour’. The Egyptian pyramids were not con-
structed by slaves but by conscripted Egyptian labour, and as such they 
constitute a form of stockpiled activity. There is no labour outside of the 
State apparatus, and human activity is transformed into labour only in 
relation to the State. 
Money. Finally, just as labour does not exist outside the State, neither 
does money. Money was not introduced in order to serve the needs of 
commerce, as if there were fi rst an autonomous domain of ‘markets’, into 
which money was introduced to facilitate exchange (Graeber 2011: 44–5). 
Rather, the converse is the case: money was created by the State to make 
taxation possible. Money, as an abstract equivalent or unit of account, is 
an instrument of measure (metron) that makes possible a direct compari-
son between goods and services, which the State can then appropriate in 
the form of taxes or tribute (Will 1955; Foucault 2013: 133–48; Deleuze 
and Guattari 2009: 197; 1987: 442–3). For this reason, it is money that 
creates markets, and not vice versa: the ‘economy’ presupposes the State. 
As Litaker observes, money striates space-time through the emergence of 
markets, which are spaces of commercial exchange that determine the 
times of production, circulation and consumption (2014: 121). 
In short, ground rent, labour and money, in the archaic State, are 
abstract mechanisms of capture and stockpiling – ground rent captures 
the land, labour captures human activity, and money captures economic 
transactions – and each of these mechanisms converges on the person 
of the despot, who is at once ‘the eminent landowner, the entrepreneur 
of large-scale projects, and the master of taxes and prices’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987: 444). From the viewpoint of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
critique of social evolution, the State’s apparatus of capture has several 
distinct characteristics. 
First, and most importantly, the apparatus of capture creates what 
it captures. The earth, labour and money are the conditions that make 
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possible rent, surplus labour (profi t) and taxes, but these conditions are 
themselves created by the State. This is why ‘capture’ does not simply 
mean an ‘appropriation’ of what already exists; both in fact and in prin-
ciple, the State is only able to capture what it itself creates, or at least 
what it contributes to creating (446). The State plays the role of a foun-
dation, but it cannot play this role if it captures what already exists: if 
something exists before the State, it can exist without the State. For the 
State to be foundational, the State must be self-presupposing (427), and 
it is the self-presupposing nature of the State that grounds its monopoly 
power, its triple possession in principle of the totality of the earth, the 
totality of labour and the totality of money. The monopoly power of 
the State can be expressed philosophically in several ways: in the lan-
guage of suffi cient reason, the State is its own ground; in the language 
of causality, the State is causa sui (Lampert 2011: 157); in the language 
of Kant, the State produces its own conditions of possibility (and thus is 
in itself unconditioned). 
Second, the apparatus of capture is primarily a semiological process 
of abstraction (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 445). For Deleuze, every 
social formation is both a physical system (a manner of occupying space 
and time) and a semiological system (a ‘regime of signs’). In the codes of 
primitive societies, these signs were inscribed directly on the body in the 
form of markings (tattoos, circumcisions, incisions, scars, mutilations, 
and so on) that indicated one’s position in the social formation – an 
entire system of ‘mnemotechnics’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2009: 144–5). 
If the ancient despotic State was able to overcode these existing codes, 
it was because it operated with an abstract and externalised semiotics 
based on numeracy, literacy and money: the development of geometry 
and arithmetic, the invention of phonetic writing, the issuing of cur-
rency. Mone y is an abstraction that functions as an abstract equivalent 
for all goods and services. Geometry treats the earth as an abstract space 
in which all places are equivalent. Labour allows for a quantitative and 
abstract comparison of all human activities. Taken together, these three 
heads of the apparatus of capture creates an abstract locus of compari-
son in which land, goods, services, transactions and human activities are 
equalised, homogenised, compared, appropriated and stockpiled – all in 
a single process. In other words, the State operates by abstraction and is 
itself an abstraction (Sibertin-Blanc 2013: 50). 
Third, the self-presupposing and abstract nature of the State entails 
a particular type of violence, one that is itself posited as preestablished 
and preaccomplished, even if it must be reactivated every day. It is often 
said that the State has a monopoly on legitimate violence – violence 
5979_Bennett and Posteraro.indd   148 31/10/18   6:18 PM
 Against Social Evolution 149
against ‘criminals’, violence against those who capture something they 
have no ‘right’ to capture – which the State self-regulates through the 
institution of law. But this juridical coding of violence within the State 
takes place within the structural violence of the State itself, whose 
apparatus of capture simultaneously constitutes and presupposes a 
right to capture (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 448). The State, as self-
presupposing, is itself a kind of originary or primary violence that is 
always-already present, even if it never actually ‘took place’ (see Derrida 
2002). As such, it is fi rst and foremost in myth that the primary violence 
of the State fi nds expression, retrojected in an original violence against 
chaos that, at the limit, never actually occurred, even if it is omnipres-
ent in every mechanism of the State. Hence the appeal to Dumézil’s 
classic analyses of the two poles of sovereignty found in Indo-European 
myths: the jurist-kings who operate through law and a respect for obli-
gations, but also the terrifying magico-religious sovereign who oper-
ates through a magical capture that ‘binds without combat’ (Dumézil 
1988: 152; Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 424–5). The originary and 
self-presupposing violence of the State makes resistance almost impos-
sible, and it is what gives the State its ultimate power (puissance): 
territorial power (monopoly of the earth), economic power (monopoly 
of labour), monetary power (monopoly of currency) and, ultimately, 
political power (monopoly of violence).
There Has Only Ever Been One State
If the various social formations analysed in Capitalism and Schizo-
phrenia do not represent the evolutionary stages of social development, 
neither can they simply be identifi ed as the ideal types of a comparative 
sociology, despite appearances, since each type functions in a differ-
ent manner (Sibertin-Blanc 2010: 114). The concept of the ‘primitive’, 
for instance, can be seen as a type whose unity is the unity of reason, 
theoretically subsuming under a single concept a plurality of hetero-
geneous societies. By contrast, the capitalist type has a unity that is 
not only theoretical but also historical: it is a singular universal, in the 
sense that it is the result of a historically contingent process that has 
resulted in the universalisation of its singularity (Deleuze and Guattari 
2009: 140n). But Deleuze and Guattari ascribe to the State a unity of 
a completely different nature: a real unity that, whether actualised or 
virtual, is omnipresent throughout the entire social fi eld, not only in 
archaic States or modern nation-States, but even in primitive societies 
‘without a State’.
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This brings us to a third challenging thesis proposed by Deleuze and 
Guattari: there has only ever been but one State. This thesis is repeated 
throughout Anti-Oedipus (2009: 214, 220, 261) and taken up again in 
A Thousand Plateaus, and initially seems rather untenable. To under-
stand the thesis, we must again distinguish between its de facto and de 
jure aspects. Deleuze and Guattari readily admit that in fact there is an 
extraordinary plurality and diversity of existing States, and that modern 
nation-States, for instance, are very different from the archaic imperial 
State. But these de facto differences between concrete States fi nd their de 
jure ground in the ideality of a single State (pluralism = monism), which 
Deleuze and Guattari call the Urstaat (ur- [proto] + staat [state]). The 
Urstaat does not refer to a supposed fi rst state, but rather functions as an 
Idea (in the Deleuzian sense) that is present, throughout the social fi eld, 
as a virtuality or problem. Fo r Deleuze and Guattari, ‘the general theory 
of society is a generalized theory of fl ows’ or fl uxes (262), and the func-
tion of social formations is to code these fl uxes. Th e Idea of the Urstaat, 
in turn, lies at the opposite pole to the Idea of a pure fl ux (schizophre-
nia): it is the Idea of a completely captured and coded fl ow, which is ‘the 
eternal model of everything the State wants to be and desires’ (217). As 
such, however, the pure Idea of the Urstaat as such has never been ful-
fi lled in any actually existing State, including the archaic imperial state, 
which simply managed to actualise the Urstaat in its ‘purest conditions’ 
(198). In Deleuze’s terminology, the Urstaat is an immemorial Idea, that 
is, a past that has never been given as such (second synthesis). For this 
reason, the Urstaat itself ‘appears to be set back at a remove from what 
it transects and from what it resects, as though it were giving evidence 
of another dimension, a cerebral ideality [in the Platonic sense] that is 
superimposed on the material evolution of societies, a regulating idea 
[in the Kantian sense] or principle of refl ection (terror) that organizes 
the fl uxes into a whole’ (219). 
But this is also why the Urstaat necessarily functions as a principle of 
difference: every existing (de facto) State actualises the (de jure) Idea, or 
resolves the problem of capture, in a different manner. There is thus an 
internal ‘becoming’ or mutation of the State-form, but this is a mutation 
that does not constitute a progressive evolution. Rather, the principle 
of this mutation comes from the same process of capture that defi nes 
the archaic State, but functions as its supplementary double: the archaic 
State cannot overcode and capture without at the same time freeing up 
a large quantity of decoded fl ows that escape from it. It cannot create 
large-scale public works without a fl ow of independent labour escaping 
from its hierarchised bureaucracy of functionaries, notably in the mines 
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and in metallurgy. It cannot create coinage without fl ows of money 
escaping, and nourishing or giving birth to other powers (notably in 
commerce and banking). It cannot create a system of public property 
without a fl ow of private appropriation growing up beside it, and then 
starting to slip through its fi ngers. Finally, it is with the rise of private 
property that classes appear, since the dominant classes are no longer 
part of the State apparatus, but become distinct determinations that 
make use of a now-transformed apparatus. 
In a multitude of forms, in other words, the apparatus of capture 
inevitably gives rise to decoded fl ows that escape the apparatus of 
capture – fl ows of money, fl ows of labour, fl ows of property, fl ows of 
population (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 449; 2009: 223). If the fi rst 
great movement of deterritorialisation appears in the overcoding per-
formed by the despotic State, the second movement appears in the 
decoding of the fl ows that are set in motion by the despotic State’s own 
apparatus of capture. This is the ‘paranoid’ vector that is inherent in the 
State-form (Deleuze and Guattari 2009: 193): the State is at once cap-
ture and the impossibility of complete capture, since the State can only 
overcode by decoding (abstraction). The State cannot presuppose itself 
without also presupposing what escapes its form of interiority, namely, 
decoded fl ows, which are the fi gure of the ‘outside’ (dehors) of the State, 
the inverse of its Idea. Just as the State creates what it captures, it creates 
what escapes its apparatus of capture: it is the State’s form of interior-
ity (capture) that at the same time creates the State’s absolute outside 
(decoded fl ows).
It is this situation, internal to the Idea of the Urstaat, that gives rise 
to an incredible diversity of State-forms – ‘evolved empires, autonomous 
cities, feudal systems, monarchies’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 459) – 
all of which will have as their aim the recoding, by means of regular or 
exceptional topical operations, of the products of these decoded fl ows. 
Such states have apparatuses of capture quite different from those 
found in archaic states. Greek city-states, for instance, are phenomena 
of ‘trans-consistency’ defi ned by immanent networks of maritime and 
commercial circuits, and they mark a new threshold of deterritoriali-
sation in that the fl ows (of matter, money, labour) that enter and exit 
the cities (polarisation) must be deterritorialised enough to be captured 
in the circuits (432). Moreover, as Marx showed, capitalism appeared 
when the generalised decoding of fl ows set loose by the State reached a 
threshold of consistency that allowed two of these fl ows – abstract capi-
tal and naked labour – to conjugate in a differential relation. Capitalism 
would thus require a new ‘regime of signs’, a new form of abstraction, 
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that would be able to deal with unqualifi ed fl ows that have no specifi -
able content, and Deleuze and Guattari argue, famously, that it was 
only axiomatics that could play the role of a new apparatus of capture 
adequate to the capitalist formation. In all these cases, the thesis that 
there has never been but one State has as it correlate the extraordinary 
plurality of existing States (monism = pluralism). 
The Urstaat Was Active ‘Before’ its Existence. 
But this theory of the Urstaat raises a complex question regarding the 
status of the socio-political fi eld of coexistence. If States did not evolve 
out of more ‘primitive’ societies, what exactly is the relation between 
these two types of coeval formation? More precisely, how can Deleuze 
and Guattari argue that the Urstaat is present throughout the social fi eld, 
even in primitive societies, if such societies actively ward off the State? 
Deleuze and Guattari’s response to this question can be summarised in 
another provocative thesis: the Urstaat was active ‘before’ its existence. 
If primitive societies ward off the State, they must nonetheless have a 
‘presentiment’ of the State as a limit they are avoiding – a limit they could 
not reach without self-destructing. The way the Urstaat is actualised in 
historical States is quite different from the way the Urstaat pre-exists as 
a warded off limit in primitive societies. Objectively, Deleuze and Guat-
tari initially explain this phenomenon from a model drawn from physics. 
If one considers the social fi eld as a fi eld of vectors, one could say that 
primitive societies are traversed by a centripetal wave that converges on a 
point x – a point where the wave would cancel itself out and be inverted 
into a divergent and centrifugal wave, which is a reality of another order 
(the State) (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 565 n14). The point of conver-
gence marks a potential or a threshold of consistency, and the convergent 
wave has the double property of both anticipating it and warding it off. 
The State is thus ‘beyond’ primitive groups, but ‘beyond’ does not mean 
‘after’. The threshold of consistency has always existed, but primitive 
societies are content to keep that threshold at a distance. We must thus 
conceptualise the contemporaneousness of these two inverse movements 
on the fi eld of coexistence, ‘as if the two waves that seem to us to exclude 
or succeed each other unfolded simultaneously in an “archaeological,” 
micropolitical, micrological, molecular fi eld’ (431).
But there is a second issue that comes to the fore here, which is more 
subjective. Since every exchange of objects requires a way one can com-
pare the objects of exchange, no political economist can avoid the ques-
tion: How should one evaluate the criteria of exchange? Responding 
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to this question requires a theory of collective evaluations, or what one 
might call, in a Kantian vein, ‘anticipations of social perception’ (Deleuze 
1979b). In the Marxist theory of labour value, the way to compare 
exchanged objects – for instance, an iron axe and a steel axe – is to com-
pare the labour time that is socially necessary for their production, which 
requires a collective evaluation of both the worker and the entrepreneur 
using a scientifi c (or pseudo-scientifi c) form of quantifi cation. In primi-
tive societies, however, this route is closed off in advance, not because a 
measure is lacking, but because there is no ‘labour time’ to be measured. 
Human activity is in constant variation, and there is nothing that corre-
sponds to labour, much less to labour time. 
On this score, Deleuze and Guattari appeal to the nineteenth-century 
neo-classical theory of marginalism which was originally invented to 
account for the equilibrium of prices within the capitalist regime. If Marx 
held to the classical theory in which the value of commodities is derived 
from the quantity of labour required to produce them, marginalists like 
Stanley Jevons argued that value should instead be analysed in terms of the 
utility of the ‘last’ or ‘marginal’ object (Clarke 1982: 147–50). Business 
owners know that, beyond a certain limit, the structure of their business 
will have to change: there are thresholds beyond which an ‘assemblage’ 
[agencement] cannot maintain its current consistency. For example, how 
many cows can a dairy farmer purchase without making any changes in 
his business, such as adding acreage or procuring more equipment? The 
last cow he could currently buy is the ‘marginal object’, since if he pur-
chases more, he will have to fundamentally alter the size and structure of 
his business. More importantly, it is his anticipation of the last or mar-
ginal cow that determines the price he is willing to pay for the cows he 
currently needs. If his business can only sustain twenty additional cows, 
he will not buy fi fty, even if their price is substantially discounted. In mar-
ginalism, it is the evaluation of the idea of the last or ‘marginal’ object that 
determines the value of the entire series of real terms. 
Though Deleuze and Guattari fi nd marginalism weak as a general 
economic theory, they fi nd a new fi eld of application for a modifi ed 
marginalism in non-capitalist formations (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 
437). In primitive societies, they argue, the object of collective evalua-
tion is not labour time, but rather the idea of the last object or marginal 
object that governs the series of exchanges, and agriculture is incapable 
of entering into these serial schemas. We can thus conceptualise a dif-
ference between the ‘limit’ and the ‘threshold’: in a collective evalua-
tion, what is anticipated is the limit (the penultimate exchange, which 
allows one to remain in the same assemblage) but what is warded off is 
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the threshold (which would force one to change assemblage). ‘It is the 
evaluation of the last as limit that constitutes an anticipation and simul-
taneously wards off the last as threshold or ultimate (a new agence-
ment)’ (439). The threshold marks the point where stockpiling would 
begin, and the temporal succession of territories would be replaced 
by the spatial coexistence and exploitation of different territories: the 
apparatus of capture.
In both these analyses – objective and subjective – we can see how 
the State has a positive status in primitive societies as both a limit and 
threshold, even if the State does not ‘yet’ have an actual existence.
The Field of Coexistence: Types, Powers and Becomings 
The principle behind Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of traditional 
(chronological) theories of social evolution can be summarised in a fi nal 
thesis: ‘All history does is to translate a coexistence of becomings into a 
succession’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 430; cf. Lundy 2012). But what 
exactly is the nature of the fi eld of coexistence presumed by Deleuze and 
Guattari’s socio-political philosophy? We can perhaps distinguish three 
levels in their analyses of the fi eld of coexistence, which begins with 
types, then evaluates their powers, and fi nally maps out their becomings. 
At the fi rst level, Anti-Oedipus initially presents us with a typology of 
social formations, and these ‘types’ can be understood in a Bergsonian 
manner. In Matter and Memory, Bergson created his well-known concepts 
of ‘pure memory’ and ‘pure perception’: although perception and memory 
are always mixed together in experience (de facto), these concepts allowed 
him to distinguish the differences in nature (de jure) between the two lines 
or ‘tendencies’ of pure memory and pure perception. The same is true for 
Deleuze and Guattari’s typology of social formations. Although each type 
in fact coexists with the others within a single fi eld of coexistence – in 
our contemporary situation, States, war-machines and archaic territori-
alities all coexist within the capitalist axiomatic – each concept is a tool 
that allows one to demarcate distinctions or differences in kind within the 
social multiplicity (Bogue 2004: 172–3). 
At a second level, however, A Thousand Plateaus characterises each 
of these types in terms of a specifi c ‘machinic process’: primitive societ-
ies are characterised by mechanisms of anticipation/prevention; States 
are characterised by apparatuses of capture; nomadic war-machines 
by the occupation of smooth space; cities by instruments of polarisa-
tion; ecumenical organisations by the encompassment of heterogeneous 
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formations; capitalism by decoding/axiomatisation. This is no longer a 
question of types; rather, each of these processes is a power [puissance] 
that indicates a certain capacity or capability of a social formation. 
Primitive societies anticipate and ward off, archaic States capture: this 
is what they ‘can do’, what they are capable of. In a Spinozistic manner, 
each of these powers or processes must be grasped positively as a deter-
minate quantity of reality (see Sibertin-Blanc 2013: 41–6). One problem 
with evolutionary schemas is that they tend to view social formations 
through the prism of the State-form, which leads to the litany of ‘societies 
without’ – ‘without a State’, ‘without history’ ‘without writing’. But 
this focus on the State-form winds up assigning privation and lack to 
other formations, severing them from the forms of power that each of 
them affi rms positively. The second level thus takes us from Bergson to 
Spinoza: beneath the categorial typology of social formations, one fi nds 
an ethological map of their constitutive powers, ‘a logic of coessential 
positivities and coexisting affi rmations’ (Deleuze 1988: 95). 
But the third level is uniquely Deleuzo-Guattarian. Far from being 
governed by a single form of power, every social formation, both in 
fact and in principle, is composed of a plurality of processes that are 
in ‘perpetual interaction’ with each other (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 
430), and each process can function at a ‘power’ other than its own. 
Anticipation-prevention mechanisms, for instance, ‘are at work not only 
in primitive societies, but are transferred into Cities that ward off the 
State-form, into the State that wards off capitalism, and into capital-
ism itself, which wards off and repels its own limits’ (437). Similarly, 
the State is able to capture, not only land, activity and exchange, but 
also the anticipation-prevention mechanisms themselves, as well as the 
war-machine and the instruments of polarisation that characterise cities. 
And the powers ‘become’ something other when they enter into rela-
tions with each other: the power of the war-machine changes nature 
when it is ‘appropriated’ by the State, just as the State’s apparatus of 
capture changes nature when it is subordinated to the worldwide capi-
talist market. This is the sense of the term ‘becoming’: it is what takes 
place between two multiplicities, changing their nature. What appears in 
evolutionary theories as a chronological succession is, for Deleuze and 
Guattari, a phenomenon of transfer or transport between becomings. In 
each case, one must ask: What is a social formation capable of? What 
can it tolerate or support? What are the processes that exceed its capaci-
ties for reproduction, and put it in question? When does it pass its limit 
and enter into a new threshold of consistency? How does it become? 
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Thus, we have to say that the term ‘fi eld of coexistence’ does not sim-
ply refer to an external and de facto coexistence of social formations 
in a historical space-time, but more profoundly to an intrinsic and 
de jure coexistence of powers and processes in a non-historical space-
time, a continuum in which divergent temporalities coexist. This is what 
Deleuze calls the ‘plane of immanence’, a fi eld where all the powers of 
THE social machine coexist virtually, in constant becoming, enveloped 
and implicated in each other in ‘a topological space and a stratigraphic 
time’ (Lapoujade 2014: 218). 
Notes
 1. Both the second chapter of Difference and Repetition, entitled ‘Repetition-for-
Itself’ (Deleuze 1994: 70–128), and Cinema II: The Time-Image (Deleuze 1989) 
develop in detail Deleuze’s metaphysic of time.
 2. Deleuze’s concept of actualisation is deeply indebted to the work of Raymond 
Ruyer, most notably his 1946 book Éléments de Psycho-biologie. See in particu-
lar chapter 6 (‘The Problems of Actualization’), and the important section on 
‘Actualization and Time’ (109–14): ‘In the bio-psychological order, the real fact 
is the passage to the actual . . . of a potential which is not itself in time, although 
it is progressively modifi ed by its own actualizations’ (110).
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